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Abstract: We focus on the Moulin-Shenker cost sharing rule as a natu-
ral extension of the serial rule to multi-service facilities where services
are personalized. We show that it is the unique regular rule that is com-
patible with scale invariance and self consistency.
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1 Introduction
This paper focusses on the problem of allocating the cost of usage of a
production facility jointly owned by a fixed group of agents. Instead of
technologies generating a single (divisible) output, here we concentrate
on those multi-commodity situations where each of the (divisible) goods
is personalized. Each of the agents i = 1, 2, . . . , n has an interest in
qi units of good i, and we look for an equitable way of distributing the
corresponding total cost c(q1, q2, . . . , qn) among the n agents. Then,
the more eligible devices will be dependent on the level of individu-
al demands. In the literature, different solutions have been proposed,
for instance Aumann-Shapley pricing (Aumann-Shapley (1974), Billera
and Heath (1982)), the ordinally proportional rule (Sprumont (1997)),
the Shapley-Shubik mechanism (Shubik (1962)), the Friedman-Moulin
rule (Friedman and Moulin (1995)) and the Moulin-Shenker rule (Spru-
mont (1997)).
In this paper we focus on the latter, the Moulin-Shenker rule, that was
analyzed by Sprumont (1997). Just like the Friedman-Moulin rule, it
is an extension of the serial rule (Moulin and Shenker (1992a, 1992b),
Moulin (1996)) in the sense that for each homogeneous cost sharing
problem it proposes the serial cost shares for the naturally related one-
dimensional problem. Sprumont (1997) argues that cost shares should
not depend on the conventions used to measure an agent’s demand. The
principle that requires robustness of a cost sharing rule with respect to
essentially any transformation of measuring scales, is called ordinali-
ty. Then, consequently, this plea for transformation robust mechanisms
rules out the Friedman-Moulin rule since it is not even scale invariant.
All other earlier mentioned mechanisms satisfy scale invariance, but
ordinality is only consistent with Shapley-Shubik, Moulin-Shenker and
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the ordinally proportional rule. Sprumont (1997) provides a very com-
pact characterization of the Moulin-Shenker rule, but this does not rely
on ordinality or scale invariance at all. The characterizing set of axioms
consists of one rather technical axiom, partial differentiability, and the
interesting serial principle. The serial principle is the natural extension
of the property independence of size of larger demands (Moulin and
Shenker (1992a)). It seems to be the most essential feature for serial
cost sharing, by which the smaller agents are protected against possibly
excessive behavior of the larger demanders. In this paper we show that
the serial principle is implied by the combination of self consistency,
no exploitation and continuity of the cost sharing rule as a function of
demands. Now, in order to obtain a full characterization of the Moulin-
Shenker rule we include in addition the property scale invariance and
a very weak technical condition null homogeneity. So we do not need
the full power of ordinality in order to characterize the Moulin-Shenker
rule. It suffices to focus on the classic property of scale invariance that
incorporates robustness of the rule against all linear transformations of
scale.
2 The model and definitions
Throughout the paper we will concentrate on a fixed and finite group of
agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Its members jointly own some production
facility for some set of goods. The output goods are personalized in the
sense that there is at most one interested agent for each output. So we
can speak of the set of goods N , where good i ∈ N is for agent i ∈ N .
A particular level of demanded output can then be described by a vector
q ∈ IRN+ , where the i-th coordinate qi is the demand of agent i for good
i. Then the demand space is partially ordered by the natural ordering
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≤. For all q, q′ ∈ IRN+ , q < q
′ if and only if qj ≤ q′j for all j ∈ N with
strict inequality for at least one coordinate. Whenever qj < q′j for all
j ∈ N then we write q  q′. The power set of N is denoted by P(N).
For q ∈ IRN+ and S ∈ P(N), qS is the demand profile obtained from q,
where the demands of the players inN\S are set to 0. The profile out of
q ∈ IRN+ where the demand of a player i is interchanged with t ∈ IR+ is
denoted by (q−i, t). The Euclidean norm of a vector q ∈ IRN+ is denoted
by ‖q‖.
We assume that all information about the costs involved with bringing
production up to a certain level is given by a cost function c : IRN+ → IR+.
In this paper we will only be concerned with cost functions c that are con-
tinuously differentiable and increasing, i.e. if x < y then c(x) < c(y).
Moreover the partial derivatives of c are supposed to be bounded away
from 0 and∞, i.e. there are a(c), b(c) > 0 such that
a(c) ≤ Dic ≤ b(c) for all i ∈ N.
Here Dic denotes the i-th partial derivative, which is continuous by
assumption. In addition there are no fixed costs, which amounts to the
condition c(0) = 0. The class of all such cost functions is denoted by
C. Furthermore, a cost function is called normalized if Dic(0) = 1 for
all i ∈ N .
A cost sharing problem is an ordered pair (q, c) ∈ IRN+ × C. The class
of all cost sharing problems is denoted by G. A cost sharing rule is a
mapping x : G → IRN+ associating to each cost sharing problem (q, c) an
efficient vector of cost shares x(q, c) ∈ IRN+ , i.e.
∑
i∈N xi(q, c) = c(q).
Sprumont (1997) argues that cost sharing rules should be invariant under
all ordinal transformations of the cost sharing problem. Modelling a
cost sharing problem differently, by just redefining the measure scales
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should not affect the outcome of the allocation process. The allocation
should not depend on the conventions used to measure the demands. For
our purposes, we need only the more familiar notion of scale invariance,
which imposes independence of rescaling units of the measuring scales.
Definition A function f : IRN+ → IR
N
+ is a positive linear transformation
of scales if there is λ ∈ IRN++ such that f(q) = (λ1q1, . . . , λnqn) for
all q ∈ IRN+ . A cost sharing rule x is scale invariant (SI) if for all
such mappings f and all cost sharing problems (q, c) ∈ G it holds
that x(q, c) = x(f(q), c ◦ f−1).
For instance, if the output of some good is measured by weight, scale
invariance tells us that the cost shares should not depend on the fact that
we expressed the amounts in kilos instead of tons. We like to stress
the gap between ordinality and scale invariance: ordinality requires also
invariance with respect to all non-linear increasing transformations of
the measuring scales.
Also we like robustness of a rule with respect to small changes in the
data that is used to model the cost sharing problem. For instance, small
pertubations of the demand profile should not result in large changes in
the cost shares.
Definition A cost sharing rule x is continuous (CONT) if for all c ∈ C,
the mapping q 7→ x(q, c) is continuous.
Less familiar will be the following property that prescribes the limiting
behavior of a rule on a very specific class of cost sharing problems ,
Definition A cost sharing rule x is null homogeneous (NHOM) if for
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all cost sharing problems (q, c) ∈ G with Dic(0) = 1 for all i ∈ N ,








where eN ∈ IR
N
+ is the vector with all coordinates 1.
Null homogeneity expresses the feeling that when a problem resem-
bles a homogeneous problem very much, then the individual cost shares
should be almost the same (compared to the size of the problem) in case
all demands are equal (in absolute terms). All earlier mentioned rules
satisfy NHOM, and it is in this sense that it can be considered as very
weak. It can not be used to distinguish between other well-known cost
sharing rules.
3 The Moulin-Shenker rule
Just like the Aumann-Shapley pricing mechanism, the Friedman-
Moulin serial extension determines cost shares through measuring
the marginal cost along some curve in the demand space toward-
s the aggregate demand. If q is an ordered demand profile, i.e.
qi ≤ qj whenever i ≤ j, then the latter mechanism uses the u-
nique increasing curve that meets at 0 and the intermediate lev-
els (q1, q1, . . . , q1), (q1, q2, q2, . . . , q2), . . . , (q1, q2, q3, . . . , qn−1, qn−1), q
and is linear inbetween. If this curve is denoted by γ then agent i ∈ N is
charged
∫
γDic. When the argument of γ is seen as a time parameter, it
can be considered to describe a production process. Typically, by taking
the same type of production curve for all cost structures, this yields an
additive method. As is pointed out in Friedman and Moulin (1995) and
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Kolpin (1996) additivity is too demanding in combination with the serial
idea and scale invariance.
Consider the following system of differential equations for (q, c) ∈ G.
Focus on a mapping γ : IR+ → IR
N





for all t ≥ 0 s.t. γi(t) < qi
0 otherwise.
(1)
It can be shown that there is a unique mapping γq,c that satisfies the
above equalities. Essentially, this is due to the fact that the mapping
q 7→ 1
Dic(q)
satisfies a Lipschitz condition (see Coddington and Levinson
(1955)). Note that this curve heavily depends on the demand profile q
and the cost function c ∈ C. The solution γq,c can also be interpreted
as a production device. Suppose that the intensity at which an agent
i is served by means of the plan γq,c at moment t is measured by the
corresponding marginal cost Dic(γq,c(t))Diγq,c(t). Then γq,c can be
intuitively interpreted as a device by which goods are distributed with
equal intensity for those agents that are not fully served at t, since for
those agents i, it holds Dic(γq,c(t))Diγq,c(t) = 1.
The Moulin-Shenker rule now charges agent i for the marginal costs
Dic along the production device γq,c in the cost sharing problem (q, c).
Definition Let (q, c) ∈ G. The Moulin-Shenker rule xMS determines
the individual cost shares by taking the integral of all marginal cost
along the curve γq,c, which solves the above system of differential
equations (1). Then for all i ∈ N ,







The Moulin-Shenker rule is a serial extension that captures the ideas of
scale invariance and demand monotonicity, at the cost of additivity. As
one might expect, this can only be achieved when such a production
device varies not only with the profile of demands but also with the cost
structure at hand.
The rest of the paper is devoted to studying the Moulin-Shenker rule
as a special member of the general class of all path generated cost
sharing methods, which propagates the serial principle as the common
characteristic. The serial principle prevents the smaller agent to get
overexposed to the consequences of contingent excessive behavior of
other agents. This principle was formulated for the one good case by
Moulin and Shenker (1992a) as independence of size of larger demands.
The corresponding formulation makes use of intercomparison of indi-
vidual demands. But, typically, the asymmetric multi-good case lacks a
natural ordering by which demands can be directly compared. Still, if a
mechanism is singled out for some fairness properties, then there is just
one consistent way of comparing the demands, and that is by comparing
the size of the corresponding cost shares for the problem at hand. The
serial principle then urges that once the mechanism values the demand
of an agent i lower than that of agent j, any further increase of agent j’s
demand should have no effect at all on agent i’s cost share.
Definition A cost sharing rule satisfies the serial principle if for all
cost sharing problems (q, c) ∈ G it holds that for all i ∈ N and
j ∈ N\{i} with xj(q, c) ≥ xi(q, c) it holds that for t ≥ qj,
xi((q
−j, t), c) = xi(q, c).
In general, though the names are quite suggestive, being a serial exten-
sion is not sufficient for a method to satisfy the serial principle. The
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Friedman-Moulin rule illustrates this distinction; it is a serial extension
only.
Next we will define the class of path generated cost sharing meth-
ods. The idea is in fact adopted from Sprumont (1997), but notations
are different.
For S ⊆ N a path in IRS+ is a continuous mapping π : IR+ → IR
S
+
with π(0) = 0. The path π is increasing if πi(t) < πi(t′) for all i ∈ S if
only t < t′. In our setting, with the argument of π thought of as being
time, an increasing path may be considered as a program for production.
At time t an amount of good i equal to πi(t) units is produced for agent
i.
Suppose that for each pair (d, c) ∈ G we have an increasing path πd,c,S
for S such that for each q ∈ IRS+ there is t ∈ IR+ with π
d,c,S(t) > q.
Such a path will be considered to describe a fictitious production plan
for coalition S from level d ∈ IRN+ . Possibly such a plan will depend on
the exogeneous information of costs that is summarized by c ∈ C.
Π is defined as the collection of all those paths, one for each triple
(d, c, S) ∈ IRN+ × C × P(N). We will refer to Π as a path collection.
A path collection Π defines for each cost sharing problem (q, c) ∈ G a
production plan, casu quo a path π for N in the following way.
We start at production level 0. Initially, we take the path forN , π0,c,N as
a production device, telling us for each moment in time what is produced
for the individual agents. So follow π0,c,N up to the earliest moment t1
that some agents M1 ⊆ N are satisfied, i.e.
π0,c,Ni (t1) = qi for all i ∈M1.
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Define π on [0, t1] by π(t) = π0,c,N(t). Let d1 denote the total demand
that is processed so far, d1 = π(t1). Still, an agent i ∈ N\M1 needs
qi − d1i units of good i in order to be satisfied. Next, we take π
d1,c,N\M1
as the additional production plan for N\M1 until the first moment t2
that some agents M2 ⊆ N\M1 are satisfied, i.e.
πd
1,c,N\M1(t2) = qi − d
1
i for all i ∈M2.
The definition of π is now completed up to moment t1 + t2 by
π(t+ t1) := d
1 + (0M1, π
d1,c,N\M1(t)) for all t ∈ (0, t2].
Let d2 = π(t1 + t2). Follow the production device πd
2,c,N\(M1∪M2) until
moment t3 where the first agentsM3 ⊆ N\(M1∪M2) are fulfilled with
their remaining needs qM3 − d
2
M3
. Then define, for all t ∈ (0, t3],
π(t+ t1 + t2) = d
2 + (0M1∪M2, π
d2,c,N\(M1∪M2)(t)).
In this way we can go on and complete the definition of π. We just
proceed by determining time levels t4, t5, . . . and corresponding groups
of agentsM4,M5, . . . until the first moment t1 + . . .+ tk such that there
are no remaining demanders, i.e. N\(M1 ∪ . . . ∪Mk) = ∅. Note that
π(t) = q when t > t1 + t2 + . . .+ tk. We will say that π is the path for
(q, c) generated by Π.
Definition The solution for the cost sharing problem (q, c) ∈ G gener-
ated by a path collection Π is the vector xΠ(q, c) ∈ IRN+ defined as
follows. Let π be the path for (q, c) generated by Π. Suppose that
according to π agent i is satisfied at moment ti. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume that ti ≤ tj whenever i ≤ j for all i, j ∈ N . We split
the successive cost increments c(π(ti+1)) − c(π(ti)) equally among
the agents requiring service on the interval (ti, ti+1]. By assumption
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this is the set of agents {i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , n}. Then this boils down to
xΠ1 (q, c) =
c(π(t1))
N
as the cost share for agent 1, while the cost shares
for the other agents i ∈ N are inductively defined through






By varying over all cost sharing problems in G this yields a cost
sharing rule xΠ, generated by the path collection Π.
We will also say that in the above definition the cost shares for the prob-
lem (q, c) are generated by Π. Note that in essence for a path generated
method only the images of the paths are of importance for determining
the cost allocation; any other parametrization of the paths determines
the same rule. Keeping this in mind, one should have no problem with
the following.
Lemma 3.1 Let f : IRN+ → IR
N
+ be a linear transformation of measuring
scales. Suppose x is a scale invariant cost sharing rule that is gener-
ated by a path collection Π = {πd,c,S | (d, c, S) ∈ IRN+ ×C×P(N)}.
If the cost shares for (q, c) ∈ G are generated by π, then the cost
shares for (f−1(q), c ◦ f) are generated by f−1 ◦ π.
A simple but important observation is that each path generated
method indeed satisfies the serial principle. Sprumont (1997) proves
the converse of this statement for all continuous mechanisms.
Lemma 3.2 (Sprumont (1997)) A continuous cost sharing mechanism
satisfies the serial principle if and only if it is generated by a path
collection.
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Fix a cost function c ∈ C. For each d ∈ IRN+ , let c
d ∈ C be the cost func-
tion that relates each increase of demand q after d to the corresponding
incremental cost, i.e. cd(q) = c(d + q) − c(q) for all q ∈ IRN+ . An
ordered pair (d, S) ∈ IRN+ × P(N) gives rise to a system of differential
equations in the following way. Let γ : IR+ → IR
N
+ be such that for all





By the regularity assumptions on c this system has a unique solu-
tion, which we will denote by γd,c,S . Then by varying over all triples
(d, c, S) ∈ IRN+ ×C ×P(N) this gives rise to a path collection Γ, which
in turn generates the Moulin-Shenker rule. Note that γd,c,S = γ0,c
d,S for
all (d, c, S) ∈ IRN+ × C × P(N).
Note that in our setting the serial principle implies positivity, i.e. qi > 0
implies xi(q, c) > 0 for all i ∈ N and all problems (q, c) ∈ G. For every
non-positive mechanism possibly free-riders enter the picture. Any in-
crease of any agent’s demand causes a rise of total cost, so the impact on
total cost of any non-zero demander is considered to be positive. Con-
sequently, positivity can be considered as compelling for our purposes.
Another resulting principle encompasses the fairness concept, that a-
gents cannot profit from others just by their presence. This criterium
is better known as no exploitation (NOEXP); if an agent has demand 0
then his share of total costs should not exceed 0.
It is easily seen that that for every positive cost sharing rule the content of
null homogeneity is exactly rendered, for all normalized cost functions





= 1 for all i, j ∈ N. (4)
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Sprumont (1997) shows that among the class of all path generated meth-
ods there is only one for which all partial derivatives w.r.t. the demand
input exist, and that is xMS. Actually, it can be shown that xMS is contin-
uously differentiable. Before we are ready for another characterization,
we need to focus on another feature of the Moulin-Shenker rule first.
In Moulin and Shenker (1992) we find the property free lunch which
combines a mild form of justice with a weak form of consistency (see
also Kolpin (1994) and Thomson (1990, 1995)). To generalize this idea
we develop the notion of self-consistency. This notion makes it possible
to link outcomes for problems of different size.
Essentially, a cost sharing mechanism is used as an instrument of eval-
uation; the agent with the larger cost share can be considered to have
a larger demand. In this way, for a problem (q, c), all the demands are
equally valued by a cost sharing rule x if and only if xi(q, c) = xj(q, c)
for all i, j ∈ N .
Fix a cost sharing problem (q, c) and a cost sharing rule x. Suppose
that we provide all agents with equally valued parts of their demands;
agent i gets di ≤ qi such that xi(d, c) = xj(d, c) for all i, j ∈ N . Then
the reduced cost sharing problem is defined by the profile of unfulfilled
demands q − d, and the cost data for any level of production beyond d
as is summarized by cd. Now self-consistency allows for determining
the final cost shares by independently solving the problems (d, c) and
(q − d, cd) and taking the sum over the corresponding outcomes.
In the same spirit we deal with those situations where there are some
zero demanders. It is reasonable to require that just their presence
should have no effect on the allocation of costs for the other agents.
Suppose again that d is a demand profile smaller than q, such that the
non-zero demanders are equally evaluated by the mechanism x. Then
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self-consistency proposes x(q, c)S = x(d, c)S + x(q − d, cd)S , where
S is the set of the non-zero demanders for q. So, if cost shares differ,
then this is not due to the part of the problem that the agents are equally
charged for, but due to asymmetries in the related reduced problem.
Definition A cost sharing rule x satisfies self-consistency (SCONS) if
for all cost sharing problems (q, c) ∈ G such that qN\S = 0N\S for
some S ∈ P(N) and d ≤ q such that xi(d, c) = xj(d, c) for all
i, j ∈ S,
x(q, c)S = x(d, c)S + x(q − d, c
d)S.
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Lemma 3.3 A continuous cost sharing mechanism satisfies no exploita-
tion and self consistency only if it is generated by a collection of paths.
Proof Let x be a continuous cost sharing mechanism that satisfies no
exploitation and self consistency. We will define a collection of paths
by which x is generated. Let p0,c,N be the set {q ∈ IRN+ |xi(q, c) =
c(q)
n
for all i ∈ N}. We claim the following:
(i) For each t ≥ 0 there is exactly one q ∈ p0,c,N with c(q) = t.
(ii) If q, q′ ∈ p0,c,N , q 6= q′ either q  q′ or q′  q.
First we will prove (i). The first step consists of showing that there
is at least one such q for all t ∈ IR+. For t = 0, obviously there is
only such q and that is q = 0. Let t > 0 and define A(t) to be the
isocost surface for c at level t. Denote the unit simplex in IRN+ by ∆
N .
Then h : A(t) → ∆N with h(q) = q∑
i∈N
qi
for all q ∈ A(t) defines a
homeomorphism. Denote its continuous inverse by h−1. Next define the
mapping g : ∆N → ∆N by g(q) = 1
t
x(h−1(q), c). Then by continuity
of both q 7→ x(q, c) and h−1, it follows that g is continuous. Note that
for all q ∈ ∆N it holds that {qi = 0 ⇒ gi(q) = 0} by no exploitation.
We are ready if we prove that there is a z ∈ ∆N such that gi(z) = 1n for












for all i ∈ N.
We claim thatG(z) = z implies gi(z) = 1n for all i ∈ N . Suppose the op-
posite,G(z) = z while not gi(z) = 1n for all i ∈ N . Then there are k, l ∈





− gj(z), 0} > 0
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and thereforeGi(z) < zi + max{ 1n − gi(z), 0}. For i = k this converts
to Gk(z) < zk, which leads to contradiction.
Observe that G(∆N ) ⊂ ∆N , since by no exploitation Gi(q) > 0, also
for the case qi = 0. But now we are there, since by invoking Brouwer’s
Theorem we guarantee existence of such a fixed point z for G.
Now, we turn to proving uniqueness. Suppose that for q1, q2 ∈ p0,c,N
such that q1 6= q2, it holds that c(q1) = c(q2). Define q∗ := q1 ∨ q2.
Then, in particular it holds that q∗ > q1 and thus c(q∗) > c(q1).
By self-consistency we have x(q∗, c) = x(q1, c) + x(q∗ − q1, cq
1
) and
x(q∗, c) = x(q2, c) + x(q∗ − q2, cq
2
). Since x(q1, c) = x(q2, c), it holds
that
x(q∗ − q1, cq
1
) = x(q∗ − q2, cq
2
). (5)






i , so by no exploitation
the cost share of agent i is either 0 in the cost sharing problem (q∗ −
q1, cq
1
) or in the cost sharing problem (q∗−q2, cq
2
). But then by equality
(5) we get x(q∗ − q1, cq
1
) = 0, and consequently x(q1, c) = x(q∗, c).









∗, c) = c(q∗).
So, this proves our first claim.
Then, a direct consequence of (i) is that each t ≥ 0 defines a unique bun-
dle y(t) ∈ p0,c,N such that c(y(t)) = t. We will prove that the mapping
y : t 7→ y(t) is continuous. Continuity at t = 0 is obvious. Suppose on
the contrary that there is t∗ > 0 and a sequence t1, t2, . . . in IR++ such that
limk→∞ tk = t∗, while the sequence y(t1), y(t2), ... does not converge
to y(t∗). Take ε > 0 such that Bε := {z ∈ IR
N
+ | ‖y(t
∗) − z‖ < ε} is




2, . . . of t1, t2, . . .




Then the sequence y(t′1), y(t
′
2), . . . is contained in the compact set




2, . . .
of t′1, t
′




2), . . . converges, say to q. Observe that
q 6= y(t∗). By continuity of x, it holds for all i ∈ N ,
















Consequently, also q ∈ p0,c,N and c(q) = t∗, but with y(t∗) as the unique
vector satisfying these conditions, we reached a contradiction. So, y is
continuous.
We will now prove (ii). Take q, q′ ∈ p0,c,N such that q 6= q′. Then
(i) implies c(q) 6= c(q′). Without loss of generality we will assume that
c(q′) < c(q). Suppose that not q′  q. By the continuity of y, there is a
maximal t′ < c(q′) such that y(t′) ∈ [0, q]. Hence, by self consistency,
x(q, c) = x(y(t′), c) + x(q − y(t′), cy(t
′)).
But for all i ∈ N , we havexi(q, c)−xi(y(t′), c) = 1n(c(q)−c(y(t
′))), and
therefore corresponding to x all shares in the problem (q − y(t′), cy(t
′))
are equal. However, t′ is taken such that (q − y(t′))i = 0 for at least
one coordinate i ∈ N . Then, by no exploitation, the corresponding
cost share of agent i is 0, hence the corresponding cost shares for the
others are also 0. On the other hand, cost shares sum up to the total cost
cy(t
′)(q−y(t′)), which equals c(q)− c(y(t′)) = c(q)− t′. But recall that






′)) = c(q)− t′ > 0,
a contradiction. Therefore q′  q, which ascertains the validity of our
second claim.
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Now (i) together with (ii) show that p0,c,N is the image of a path,
which we will denote by π0,c,N .
We proceed as follows. Define for all d ∈ p0,c,N and nonempty sets
S ⊂ N the set pd,c,S by




cd((0N\S, q)) for all i ∈ S}.
Then, essentially by the same reasoning as before, it follows that pd,c,S
is the image of a path πd,c,S. Take again d′ as element of one of the
previously defined sets pd,c,S , and let d1 := d + (0N\S, d′). Define for










((0N\S1, q)) for all i ∈ S
1}.
Again, essentially the same techniques as before show that this is the
image of a path for S1. In exactly the same way we proceed inductively
by defining paths for coalitions of decreasing size. At the end of this
procedure there still may be combinations (d, c, S) left for which πd,c,S
is not defined; for any of those triples we take πd,c,S to be an arbitrary
path. Then this completes the definition of a path collection Π.
It is now an easy excercise to show that it constitutes x, or x = xΠ.
Let q ∈ IRN+ . Suppose q ∈ π
0,c,N(IR+). Then according to xΠ, costs
c(q) are split equally. But recall the definition of p0,c,N which con-
tains q, in order to see that the same division is made in case of x.
If q 6∈ π0,c,N(IR+), then let t1 be the first moment that π0,c,N meets
the demands of the agents N1. Let d1 := π0,c,N(t1) and suppose that
(q− d1)N\N1 ∈ π
d1,c,N\N1(IR+). First notice that xi(d1, c) = 1nc(d
1) for
all i ∈ N . Suppose that the vector of remaining demands (q − d1)N\N1
is on the path for N\N1, πd
1,c,N\N1. Then as a consequence
18








Thus, by self consistency for all i ∈ N\N1,





d1(q − d1) = xΠ(q, c).
If not (q − d1)N\N1 ∈ π
d1,c,N\N1(IR+), then proceed by following
πd
1,c,N\N1 up to the first moment t2 that some agents N2 ⊂ N\N1
are satisfied with the present production level. Then the previous rea-
soning can just be replicated until, finally, a point is reached at which the
remaining demand bundle is on the corresponding path for the remaining
demanders. 2
Especially, Lemma 3.3 shows that a continuous cost sharing rule with
the properties self consistency and no exploitation satisfies the serial
principle. However, self consistency is fundamentally different from
the serial principle. For instance, it is easy to define path generated
cost sharing rules, that satisfy no exploitation and continuity and fail to
obey self consistency. Furthermore, splitting cost equally for all cost
sharing problems defines a self consistent rule that neither satisfies no
exploitation nor the serial principle.
We are now ready for the main result.
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Theorem 3.4 There is only one continuous, null homogeneous, scale
invariant cost sharing rule that satisfies the self consistency and no
exploitation, and that is the Moulin-Shenker rule.
Proof It is clear that the Moulin-Shenker rule obeys all the enlisted
principles.
Now suppose that x is a cost sharing rule satisfying CONT, NHOM, SI,
NOEXP and SCONS. We will show that x = xMS in the following way.
By Lemma 3.3 it follows that x is generated by a path collection Π.
Thus x satisfies the serial principle according to Lemma 3.2. There is
no unique way to describe Π; all other path collections resulting from
choosing other parametrizations for the paths in Π generate x as well.
Then it suffices to prove that a path collection by which x is gener-
ated can be chosen such that it equals Γ, one of the path collections
corresponding to the Moulin-Shenker rule. Therefore the theorem will
be proved if we show that, starting with an arbitrary path collection Π
generating x, for all (d, c, S) ∈ IRN+ × C × P(N) the path π
d,c,S ∈ Π is
equal to γd,c,S up to parametrization.
We claim that there is a parametrization π̄ of π0,c,N , which is a so-
lution to the above system of differential equations (3). Then π̄ must
coincide with γ0,c,N by uniqueness of the solution.
Then by simple variations the same reasoning shows that all paths of
type π0,c
d,S are equal to γ0,c
d,S up to parametrization, for all d ∈ IRN+
and S ∈ P(N).
First, we will show that πd,c,S(IR+) = π0,c
d,S(IR+). We need only to
consider those profiles d, which can actually be produced using the path
collection Π and the above construction. Suppose we have an inequality
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instead and that a cost sharing problem (q, c) the path constructed from
Π reaches the profile d after a specific period.
Then the path πd,c,S is used in the above construction from the very
moment where all agents in N\S are satisfied with production. Still,
their individual completion times for production may differ. At least
the agents in S will have made equal contributions to the procedure of
equally splitting incremental costs for raising production levels, since
they have not completed yet. So we have xi(d, c) = xj(d, c) for all
i, j ∈ S.
Let q ∈ d + (πd,c,S(IR+), 0N\S) and assume that q 6∈ d +
(π0,c
d,S(IR+), 0N\S). Then also the payments for the cost sharing prob-
lem (q, c) according to the rule x are the same for the individual agents
in S, or xi(q, c) = xj(q, c) for all i, j ∈ S. Applying SCONS gives
xi(q, c) = xi(d, c) + xi(q − d, c
d) for i ∈ S.
So, actually the cost shares for the reduced cost sharing problem (q −
d, cd) must be equal for the agents in S, xi(q− d, cd) = xj(q− d, cd) for
all i, j ∈ S. Recall the construction of sharing the cost in the cost shar-
ing problem (q−d, cd). First the production plan π0,c
d,S is used in order
to define the first production level y at which a set S′ of agents in S are
satisfied with the production so far. By assumption, however, this cannot
be the profile q−d. So y < q−d. Now the incremental cost for bringing
production from level 0 up to y are split equally among the members of
S. Then the procedure continues in order to divide the remaining costs
cd(q − d) − cd(y) among the agents S\S ′, which is a nonempty set.
Because cd(q−d)− cd(y) > 0 this means that there is at least one agent
in S\S ′ that pays more than any of the agents in S′. So there are differ-
ences in cost shares of agents in S which gives the desired contradiction.
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In the proof we roughly distinguish between four steps.
Step 1: The properties NHOM, SP and SI allow us to specify Dπ0,c,N
up to multiplication with a scalar y under the assumptions of existence






This is proved as follows. Suppose all partial derivatives of π0,c,N are






for all i ∈ N, u ∈ IRN+ .
Then by scale invariance for any q ∈ IRN+ the problem (q, c) is equivalent
with (f−1(q), c ◦ f). But the latter one is normalized in the sense that
for all i,Di(c◦f)(0) = Dic(0)Dif(0) = 1. Then by the serial principle
and null homogeneity we have for all i, j ∈ N ,
lim
r↓0
xi(reN , c ◦ f)
xj(reN , c ◦ f)
= 1.




















It is not difficult to prove the following. Let h, g : IR+ → IR+ be
continuous mappings for which h′(0) and g′(0) exist at 0, with g > 0 on
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= α =⇒ h′(0) = αg′(0).
Then this makes clear that by our regularity assumptions on Dπ0,c,N(0)








By taking y such that D1π0,c,N(0) =
y
D1c(0)
we prove our claim.
For q ∈ IRN+ we define tq := argmin{π
0,c,N(t) ≥ q}. Then tq s-
tands for the first moment that π0,c,N reaches the boundary of the cube
{u ∈ IRN+ |u ≤ q}.
Step 2: Take d ∈ π0,c,N(IR+), d 6= 0. Note that d is a demand profile for
which x determines equal cost shares. Assume now that Dπ0,c
d,N(0)
exists and Dπ0,c
d,N(0) 0. We claim that there is a y ∈ IR+ such that






Essentially this is proved with the techniques from Step 1 together with
the property SCONS. Applying Step 1 for cd instead of c immediately












On the other hand we find another expression for Diπ0,c
d,N (0) by the
relation between π0,c
d,N and π0,c,N . By SCONS and the fact that
xi(d, c) =
c(d)
|N | , we have for all d






′ − d, cd).
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Since d′ is also a demand profile for which x determines equal cost
shares, it holds for all i ∈ N
xi(d




But xi(d′− d, cd) = xj(d′− d, cd) for all i, j ∈ N if and only if the first
splitting point for the problem (d′−d, cd) isd′−d, or equivalently d′−d ∈
π0,c
d,N (IR+). So d′ ∈ π0,c,N(IR+) if and only if d′ ∈ π0,c
d,N (IR+) + d.
This in turn implies π0,c
d,N(IR+) = π0,c,N([td,∞)). Since only the
images of the paths matter we may assume that π0,c
d,N(t) = π0,c,N(td +
t) − d for all t ∈ IR+. But this gives for i ∈ N , Diπ0,c
d,N (0) =
Diπ












The mapping π0,c,N is monotonically increasing and therefore differ-
entiable almost everywhere. If only Dπ0,c,N  0 almost everywhere,
then we are done: the result from Step 2 applies for almost every
d ∈ π0,c,N(IR+), which in turn implies (9).
Let
π̃ := π0,c,N ◦ (c ◦ π0,c,N)−1. (10)
Then π̃ is a parametrization of π0,c,N by the costs; for each t ∈ IR+ it
holds that c(π̃(t)) = t. Take t ∈ IR+ and h > 0. Then,∥∥∥∥∥ π̃(t+ h)− π̃(t))h




= |N | b(c)−1 > 0.
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This implies that whenever π̃ is differentiable at t, then π̃′(t) 0. But
consequently π̃′  0 almost everywhere, since it is a monotonically in-
creasing function. There is only one possibility, and that isDπ0,c,N  0
almost everywhere. This proves our claim.
Step 4: The last part of the proof is of rather technical nature. We will
show now that the above π̃ can be used to define the proper parametriza-
tion of π0,c,N that we are looking for.
Note, that given the fact that π0,c,N is monotonically increasing we have
for almost all t ∈ IR+:
(i): π0,c,N is differentiable at (c ◦ π0,c,N)−1(t) and
Dπ0,c,N ((c ◦ π0,c,N)−1(t)) > 0.
(ii): c ◦ π0,c,N is differentiable at (c ◦ π0,c,N)−1(t) and
(c ◦ π0,c,N)′((c ◦ π0,c,N)−1(t)) > 0.
So for the parametrization π̃ of π0,c,N , defined above by (10), the fol-











Consider the curve π̄ := π̃ ◦φ, where φ(t) = |N | t for all t ∈ IR+. Then
π̄ is a parametrization of π0,c,N for which for almost all t ∈ IR+ it holds





If we can show that this equality holds for all t ∈ IR+, then we are done.
Since then we showed that π̄ is actually the parametrization of π0,c,N that
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we were looking for, because π̄ = γ0,c,N . The mapping π̄ is Lipschitz
continuous: for all t1, t2 ∈ IR+,
‖π̄(t1)− π̄(t2)‖ = ‖π̃(|N | t1)− π̃(|N | t2)‖
≤ a(c)−1|c(π̃(|N | t1))− c(π̃(|N | t2))|
= |N |a(c)−1|t1 − t2|.









By the continuity of the mapping s 7→ Dic(π̄(s))−1, it follows that π̄ is




for all t ∈ IR+.
But then π̄ is a solution of the system of differential equations that de-
termines the Moulin-Shenker path γ0,c,N . By uniqueness of the solution
π̄ must coincide with γ0,c,N . This proves our claim that π0,c,N has the
same image as γ0,c,N .
2
In the above Theorem we could have replaced the characterizing
property NHOM by the combination of some continuity requirement
with respect to the cost function combined with independence of irrel-
evant costs (IIC). IIC states that for a problem (q, c) ∈ G a cost sharing
mechanism may only use cost information that is considered to be rele-
vant for the profile q; facing two problems (q, c1) and (q, c2) with c1 = c2
on [0, q], a cost sharing mechanism x satisfying IIC should determine the
same cost shares for the two cost sharing problems . By its weakness,




In this paper we focussed on cost sharing problems associated with a
fixed agent set N . In an easy way, it is possible to enlargen the setting to
which our result applies. We will now describe the way we could have
proceded. We can define for S ⊆ N a cost sharing problem to be a pair
(d, c), where d is a demand bundle in IRS+ and c is the corresponding
cost function that relates each desired output y ∈ IRS+ to its cost. We
will take only those cost functions for consideration that satisfy similar
regularity assumptions, like continuously differentiability and bounds
on partial derivatives. Call GS the set of all cost sharing problems with
agent set S. A cost sharing rule for S relates each problem in GS to
an efficient vector of cost shares in IRS+. For the general class of cost
sharing problems, consisting of all cost sharing problems with agent
sets smaller or equal to N , a (generalized) cost sharing rule is defined as
a mapping whose restriction to each set GS defines a cost sharing rule
for S. The Moulin-Shenker rule trivially extends to a generalized cost
sharing rule. Also the contents of the properties that are used for the
above characterization, like CONT, NHOM and SI, are easily converted.
Now focus on the following version of self consistency.
Let x be a generalized cost sharing rule. In this setting it is called
a self consistent rule if only for all S ⊆ N , (q, c) ∈ GS and 0 ≤ d ≤ q
such that xi(d, c) = xj(d, c) for all i, j ∈ S it holds
x(q, c) = x(d, c) + x(q − d, cd).
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Suppose we strenghten the no exploitation property, in the sense that not
only a zero demander should pay nothing, but that he even can be totally
removed from the cost sharing problem without altering the outcomes
for the remaining agents. More formally, a generalized cost sharing rule
x has the null agent property, if for all S ⊆ N , and problems (q, c) ∈ GS
it holds for all i ∈ S,
qi = 0 =⇒ xS\{i}(q, c) = x(qS\{i}, ci),
where ci : IR
S\{i} → IR+ is the admissible cost function such that
ci(d) = c((0{i}, d)) for all d ∈ IR
S\{i}. Then, by using essentially the
same techniques as before, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.1 The generalized Moulin-Shenker rule is the unique rule
that satisfies the properties continuity, null homogeneity, null agents,
self consistency and scale invariance.
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